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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ERIC JARVIS WARREN, : Case No. 20000744-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The State's argument that the "totality of circumstances in 
this case," Appellee's Br. 13, supports the reasonableness of 
questioning Appellant Eric Jarvis Warren ["Mr. Warren"] beyond 
the scope of the initial traffic stop is not supported by the 
record. Officer Nathan Swensen ["Officer Swensen"] testified 
that, although he observed an individual leaning into the 
passenger side door of Mr. Warren's car late at night in a 
downtown location, this was not part of the reason for the 
subsequent traffic stop. R. 130 [15-16]. "xThe length and scope 
of the detention must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible,'" State 
v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, Ull, 410 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (citations 
omitted) , and in this case that circumstance was the traffic 
stop. Thus, Officer Swensen's questioning violated Mr. Warren's 
constitutional guarantees of protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 
The subsequent frisk of Mr. Warren also violated Mr. 
Warren's guarantees of protection against unreasonable searches 
and seizures because a frisk may be performed only when the 
police officer has a "reasonable, articulable suspicion that the 
suspect is armed and presently dangerous." State v. Chapman, 921 
P.2d 446, 454 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). Officer Swensen 
testified that he did not believe Mr. Warren was armed and the 
frisk was performed as a matter of routine. R. 130 [10-11, 20] . 
In arguing that the frisk was justified the State points out that 
there are general risks inherent in traffic stops and Mr. 
Warren's car was being impounded due to a traffic violation. 
Appellee's Br. 13-14. However, the authority to perform a frisk 
"must be narrowly drawn," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), 
and the general risks inherent in traffic stops do not justify 
performing a frisk. 
Finally, it is not necessary to remand this case for 
findings regarding the issue of inevitable discovery, as 
suggested by the State. The State already argued this issue 
before the trial court, relevant evidence was presented, and 
relevant findings of fact were made. On the basis of the record, 
this court may make conclusions of law regarding the inevitable 
discovery issue, as it did in the case of State v. Northrup, 756 
P. 2d 1288, 1293-94 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Thus, a remand for 
2 
further findings on this issue is not necessary. 
ARGUMENT 
I. OFFICER SWENSEN'S TESTIMONY ESTABLISHES THAT THE QUESTIONING 
OF MR. WARREN REGARDING HIS PRESENCE IN THE AREA AND EARLIER 
ACTIVITIES EXCEEDED THE REASONABLE SCOPE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP 
AND WAS NOT NECESSARY TO EFFECTUATE THE PURPOSE OF THE STOP 
The State's argument that the "totality of circumstances in 
this case" supports the reasonableness of the questioning, 
Appellee's Br. 13-14, overlooks Officer Swensen's testimony 
regarding the questioning. Without including that testimony in 
its analysis, the State points out that, before stopping Mr. 
Warren, Officer Swensen observed uan unidentified individual 
leaning into defendant's passenger side door from the curb for no 
apparent legitimate reason, given the deserted, non-residential 
downtown location, and the unusually early hour." Id. at 13. The 
State further argues that, based upon Officer Swensen's 
experience,1 this behavior suggested that a drug or prostitution 
crime was afoot. Id. 
However, Officer Swensen's observations were ultimately not 
part of his reason for stopping Mr. Warren. During the Motion to 
Suppress Hearing held 18 February 2000, Officer Swensen testified 
as follows: 
1
 Officer Swensen testified that he had been working for the 
Salt Lake Police Department for almost two years and had been 
"working on the streets" for nearly 14 months. R. 13 0 [13] . 
3 
Q [by defense counsel] : And it was at some point you say 
[Mr. Warren] signaled a lane change without - or he made a lane 
change without signaling? 
A [by Officer Swensen]: Correct. 
Q: And the reason you pulled him over was because of that? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Now, weren't you also pulling him over because you wanted 
to explore what you felt was a suspicious circumstance? 
A: No. 
Q: That didn't have anything to do with it? 
A: Had to do with the traffic stop. 
R. 130 [15-16]. When further questioned regarding his 
conversation with Mr. Warren, Officer Swensen testified: 
Q [by defense counsel]: And again, this whole discussion 
about where [Mr. Warren] was, what he was doing, who this person 
was that he dropped off, had nothing to do with the reason you 
say you stopped him? 
A [by Officer Swensen]: Correct. 
Q: Totally unrelated? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Wasn't necessary to complete that stop? 
A: No. 
Q: Okay. Now, after having this discussion, how long would 
4 
you say the discussion took place for? 
A: A minute or two. 
R. 130 [18]. 
In light of Officer Swensen's testimony, his questioning 
regarding Mr. Warren's presence in the area and earlier 
activities was not "reasonably related in scope to the traffic 
violation which justified [the stop] in the first place." State 
v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). Additionally, the 
xxxlength and [the] scope of the detention'" was not uxstrictly 
tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its 
initiation permissible." Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 
761, 763 (Utah 1991)(citation omitted)). 
The State further argues that Mr. Warren's failure to 
produce a valid driver's license "only added to the suspicious 
circumstances" justifying Officer Swensen's questioning. 
Appellee's Br. 13. However, there is no indication that Mr. 
Warren's failure to produce a valid driver's license created a 
suspicion of anything other than that Mr. Warren was driving 
without a valid driver's license.2 This is not a basis for 
2
 It is a class C misdemeanor to drive a motor vehicle when 
the driver's license is denied, suspended, disqualified, or 
revoked. Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (1998) . It is a class C 
misdemeanor to display a canceled, denied, revoked, suspended, or 
disqualified driver license as a valid driver license. Utah Code 
Ann. § 53-3-229 (Supp. 2000) 
5 
suspecting more serious criminal activity and questioning Mr. 
Warren about it. "If there is investigative questioning that 
detains the driver beyond the scope of the initial stop, it 'must 
be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal 
activity.'" State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 06, HlO, 994 P.2d 1278 
(quoting Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132). 
The State also indicates that "if Officer Swensen had held 
off the questioning until after he initiated the computer checks 
[regarding the status of Mr. Warren's license] and was awaiting 
those results, there would be no issue as to the propriety of the 
questioning.,/ Appellee's Br. 14. So, to avoid uxelevating form 
over substance,'" Officer Swensen's questioning of Mr. Warren 
should not be found to be unreasonable. Id. (quoting State v. 
James, 2000 UT 80, 1(13, 405 Utah Adv. Rep. 31) .3 Although Mr. 
3
 The State further implies that because "mere questioning" 
does not constitute "either a search or a seizure," Appellee's 
Br. 11, constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches 
and seizures do not apply. For support, the State cites Florida 
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) and United States v. 
Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1993). 
This implication is incorrect. xxxThe United States Supreme 
Court has held that 'stopping an automobile and detaining its 
occupants constitute [s] a seizure' within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, 'even though the purpose of the stop is limited 
and the resulting detention quite brief.'" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 
1131 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). 
Accord State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, fl2, 410 Utah Adv. Rep. 
28. 
6 
Warren may not have been delayed an additional length of time if 
the questioning had occurred while Officer Swensen was awaiting 
the results of the computer check, it is not only the length of 
the stop, but also the scope of the stop which must be 
"reasonably related" to the traffic violation which u"justified 
the interference in the first place.'" State v. Hansen, 2000 UT 
App 353, %9 (quoting State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996)) . Questioning Mr. Warren about his presence in the 
area and earlier activities went beyond the scope of 
investigating the original traffic violation and Mr. Warren's 
failure to produce a valid license. 
Finally, the State argues that "even if the questioning is 
deemed objectively unreasonable, it was not the questioning that 
led to the discovery of cocaine on defendant's person --it was 
the subsequent protective frisk." Appellee's Br. 14-15. The case 
of State v. Hansen, which this court recently decided, is 
directly on point. In that case the defendant was stopped for 
making an improper left turn and for failing to have car 
insurance. Id. at %2. After running a check and determining that 
the defendant had a valid driver's license and no outstanding 
warrants, the police officer asked the defendant if he had any 
"alcohol, weapons, or drugs" in his car. Id. at 113-4. The 
defendant replied that he did not have any. Id. The officer 
7 
searched the car anyway and found a homemade billy club and a 
marijuana pipe. Id. at ^5. Then the officer searched the 
defendant and found a substance later identified as 
methamphetamine. Id. 
The defendant was charged with illegal possession of a 
controlled substance, and he moved to have evidence of the 
methamphetamine suppressed because he had been illegally detained 
by the officer's questioning. Id. at 1[l, 6. His motion was denied 
and he was convicted. Id. In reversing his conviction, this Court 
concluded that the defendant "was illegally detained when Officer 
Huntington asked him questions that were not reasonably related 
in scope to the traffic violation which justified the initial 
seizure." Id. at 1 16. Thus, the questioning served as a basis 
for suppressing evidence of the methamphetamine. Therefore, the 
State's argument here that the questioning of Mr. Warren should 
not be a basis for suppressing evidence of the controlled 
substances fails. 
II. THE GENERAL RISKS INHERENT IN TRAFFIC STOPS DO NOT PROVIDE 
OFFICER SWENSEN WITH A LEGAL BASIS FOR FRISKING MR. WARREN 
WHERE THE OFFICER DOES NOT BELIEVE MR. WARREN IS CARRYING A 
WEAPON AND FRISKS MR. WARREN AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE PRIOR TO 
IMPOUNDING HIS CAR FOR A TRAFFIC VIOLATION 
The State's argument that Officer Swensen reasonably frisked 
Mr. Warren because traffic stops in general are potentially 
8 
dangerous, Appellee's Br. 15-16, and because Mr. Warren's car was 
being impounded due to his lack of a valid driver's license, Id. , 
is not supportable. In making its argument, the State points out 
that police "are entitled to take reasonable precautionary 
actions to ensure their safety during the course of a traffic 
investigation." Appellee's Br. 16 (citation omitted). The State 
also indicates that, statistically, there is a "real and 
reasonable" concern of danger in traffic stops. Id. (citations 
omitted). 
These arguments do not apply the proper test for 
reasonableness. The core test for determining whether a frisk is 
reasonable is a balancing test where the need to search is 
weighed against the personal invasion involved in the search. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State v. White, 856 P.2d 
656, 665 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . As the United States Supreme Court 
explained in Terry v. Ohio, u[e]ven a limited search of the outer 
clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, 
intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be 
an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience." 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25. Thus, to justify a frisk there must be 
the "immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to 
assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not 
armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used 
9 
against him." Terry, 3 92 U.S. at 23. 
In applying the holdings of Terry v. Ohio, the Utah Supreme 
Court said there must be a "reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that the suspect is armed and presently dangerous." State v. 
Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 454 (Utah 1996)(citation omitted).4 This 
is because the authority to "permit a protective frisk for 
weapons 'must be narrowly drawn.7" White, 856 P.2d at 665 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27) . Therefore, in deciding to frisk, 
ua police officer [must have] specific articulable facts which 
reasonably warrant the officer to believe that the suspect is 
dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons, [then] the 
officer can search the suspect and those nearby areas where a 
weapon may be hidden." State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 983-84 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing Michigan v. Long 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-
50 (1983)).5 
4
 This principal has been codified at Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-
16 (1999)(UA peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily 
for questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he 
reasonably believes he or any other person is in danger.") 
5
 See also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94 (1979) ("The 
'narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for 
weapons on less than a reasonable belief or suspicion directed at 
the person to be frisked.") 
The State argues that Mr. Warren's citations to Ybarra are 
not persuasive because that case did not involve "the dangers 
inherent in a traffic stop scenario." Appellee's Br. 17. However, 
the circumstances of Ybarra presented even more risks to officers 
10 
Under this analysis, frisks such as the one performed on Mr. 
Warren by Officer Swensen are not proper. Officer Swensen 
testified that he did not believe Mr. Warren had a weapon, R. 130 
[2 0] , and that the reason he asked Mr. Warren to step out of the 
car was to sign a citation. R. 130 [10] . Officer Swensen added: 
Whenever I pull somebody out of a car, I perform a 
Terry frisk just to see if there's weapons. . . . Also 
because of the fact that with [there] being drug 
activity and prostitution and so on, people that are 
involved in that usually carry weapons. So with that in 
mind, also for the fact that I always do that, perform 
the Terry frisk when I pull somebody out of a car, 
that's why I did it. 
R. 130 [10-11]. 
The State asserts that Officer Swensen's suspicion of drug 
or prostitution activity combined with the inherent dangers of 
than those involved in Mr. Warren's traffic stop. In Ybarra, 
officers had a search warrant, issued upon probable cause, to 
search the tavern and the bartender for xx'[h]eroin, contraband, 
other controlled substances, money, instrumentalities and 
narcotics, paraphernalia used in the manufacture, processing and 
distribution of controlled substances.'" Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 88. 
Earlier, an informant had seen "fifteen to twenty-five tin-foil 
packets" similar to the packets used in a "common method of 
packaging heroin" on the bartender. Id. at 87-88. 
Thus, in Ybarra officers faced not only the general risks of 
searching the tavern and bartender, but the possibility of 
discovering a large-scale drug operation. See Wayne R. LeFave, 
Search and Seizure: A Treatise On the Fourth Amendment § 
9.5(a) (3rd ed. 1996) (Advising that the crime of "dealing in large 
quantities of narcotics" is one of violence). Therefore, Ybarra 
is not distinguishable simply because it did not involve a 
traffic stop. 
11 
traffic stops justified this action. Appellee's Br. 18. 
With regard to the inherent dangers of traffic stops, these are 
not enough to give a police officer "reason to believe that he is 
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual . . . ." Terry, 
3 92 U.S. at 27. Nor do the general dangers of a traffic stop 
create "specific reasonable inferences," Id. that an individual 
is armed and dangerous. At any rate, Officer Swensen testified 
that he had no such suspicion in this case. R. 130 [10-11, 20] . 
Although the State supports its argument by citing to 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), which describes 
dangers inherent in traffic stops, Appellee's Br. 16, that case 
is not on point. Mimms . involved the balancing of a police 
officer's need to question an individual against the intrusion 
involved in asking him to step out of his car. Id. at 109-10. The 
legality of an invasive frisk was not involved. Id. Therefore, 
the State's reliance upon that case is not persuasive. 
Finally, Officer Swensen's suspicion of drug or prostitution 
activity does not provide the justification needed for a Terry 
frisk. What is required is a "reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that the suspect is armed and presently dangerous." Chapman, 921 
P.2d at 454 (citation omitted) . Police officers may not perform a 
frisk for any other purpose, including to verify drug or 
prostitution activity. Commentary has even suggested that u[t]he 
12 
Terry rule should be expressly limited to investigation of 
serious offenses" in part to take away the temptation for police 
to frisk individuals as part of a "fishing expedition [] for 
contraband. Permitting stops for narcotics offenses presents the 
most obvious temptation to abuse the frisk as an occasion for 
searching for contraband." LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise 
on the Fourth Amendment § 9.2 (c) (footnote omitted).6 Thus, the 
6
 The full text of the recommendation reads as follows: 
The Terry rule should be expressly limited to investigation 
of serious offenses. Admittedly, it is not easy to articulate 
offense-category limitations as a matter of Fourth Amendment 
interpretation. It is important, nonetheless, that such 
limitations be developed, for the following reasons: 
(1) Terry utilizes a balancing approach whereby the need to seize 
and search is balanced against the degree of intrusion which will 
result. The Court stressed that the officer acted "to protect 
himself and others from possible danger, and took limited steps 
to do so." The emphasis, therefore, was upon the need for 
immediate action, which simply is not present as to minor crimes. 
(2) Any extraordinary grant of police authority ought to be 
circumscribed in such a way that meaningful review is possible 
and so that the public is not apprehensive about police excesses. 
The circumstances which might lead an officer to suspect that a 
person is committing such a crime as loitering, gambling or 
disorderly conduct "are sufficiently diverse and diffuse that 
their inclusion might mean a large and hard-to-review expansion 
of coercive authority." And it must be remembered that under a 
reasonable suspicion test it is inevitable that a significant 
number of innocent persons will be stopped. But "if persons come 
to understand that they are being subjected to inconvenience only 
in cases where most persons would find such action proper and 
desirable, the cost of resentment might well be reduced." 
(3) Most important, as Judge Friendly emphasized, barring the 
13 
evidence seized by Officer Swensen as a result of this frisk 
should have been suppressed by the trial court. 
Ill THIS CASE SHOULD NOT BE REMANDED FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE 
STATE'S INEVITABLE DISCOVERY ARGUMENT BECAUSE THAT ARGUMENT 
WAS GIVEN BELOW, RELEVANT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED, AND 
FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING THE RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE 
ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
Because the State presented its inevitable discovery 
argument below, a remand is not necessary and conclusions of law 
should be drawn from the record already before this Court. The 
State presented its inevitable discovery argument during oral 
arguments on Mr. Warren's Motion to Suppress on 20 March 2000. R. 
131 [12-13] . The State briefed the trial court about inevitable 
discovery by outlining legal arguments to the court and referring 
to testimony presented during the motion to suppress hearing held 
18 February 2000. R. 131 [12-13]. At the motion to suppress 
hearing, Officer Swensen testified about events relevant to the 
police from employing stop and frisk for such minor crimes as 
possession of narcotics will remove the temptation for the police 
to go on fishing expeditions for contraband. Permitting stops for 
narcotics offenses presents the most obvious temptation to abuse 
the frisk as an occasion for searching for contraband. There are, 
to be sure, a number of means for dealing with the problem of 
abuse of the frisk (as opposed to the stop) in regard to 
narcotics. . . . However, . . . it is preferable to deal with 
this problem by removing narcotics offenses from the scope of the 
stop and frisk authority altogether. 
LaFave, supra, § 9.2 (c) (footnote omitted). 
14 
inevitable discovery issue, including Mr. Warren's traffic stop, 
detainment, arrest, and the impoundment of his car. R. 12 9 [2-
22] .7 Additionally, the record includes the Information,8 Mr. 
Warren's "Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized Illegally" and 
supporting memorandum, and the State's asserted facts and 
response. R. 14-16, 43-62. Finally, the trial judge issued 
findings of fact relevant to the inevitable discovery issue, 
7
 Details from Officer Swensen testimony that are relevant to 
the issue of inevitable discovery include: 
- Officer Swensen ran a check on Mr. Warren's diver's 
license, and found that his license had been denied because Mr. 
Warren did not pay the reinstatement fees. R. 120 [7] . 
- Officer Swensen decided to impound Mr. Warren's vehicle 
because he did not have a valid driver's license. R. 120 [8] . 
- Officer Swensen intended to cite Mr. Warren for failure to 
turn, failure to signal before the turn, and driving without a 
driver's license. R. 120 [8-9]. 
- Officer Swensen had Mr. Warren step out of the car to sign 
the citation, and to inform him that the car would be impounded. 
R. 120 [20]. 
- Mr. Warren informed Officer Swensen that the car belonged 
to Mr. Warren's father. R. 120 [20]. 
- Officer Swensen did not intend to arrest Mr. Warren at 
that time, and Mr. Warren would have been free to go. R. 120 
[21] . 
8
 The Information includes a "Probable Cause Statement" which 
indicates that Officer S. Wozab assisted Officer Swensen in 
searching Mr. Warren's vehicle, and xx [u] nderneath the armrest on 
the front seat, the Officers located a knife, two additional 
pipes, filters, and a pen tube with residue." R. 16. 
15 
including the impoundment of Mr. Warren's car and arrest. R. 82-
84.9 
The State cites to State v. Topanotes, 2000 UT. App. 311, 
408 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (petition for cert, filed (No. )), in 
arguing that a remand for factual findings on the issue of 
inevitable discovery is proper. Appellee's Br. 19. However, in 
that case, the issue of inevitable discovery was raised for the 
first time on appeal and was not presented below.10 Here, the 
9
 The findings of fact relevant to the issue of inevitable 
discovery include: 
(6) Officer Swensen then returned to his patrol car 
and ran a license check on the defendant and 
was informed that the defendant's license was denied for 
reinstatement fees. Officer Swensen then re-approached the 
vehicle and asked the defendant to step out of the car in 
order to have him sign a citation for the traffic violations 
and because he was going to impound the vehicle due to the 
defendant's failure to have a valid license. 
(7) When the defendant stepped out of the vehicle, 
Officer Swensen as part of his routine performed a 
"Terry" frisk for weapons. During the frisk a small 
white plastic twist fell from beneath the defendant' s 
sweat shirt. Believing the twist to be a controlled 
substance, Officer Swensen placed the defendant under 
arrest. A more thorough search was then performed 
wherein additional controlled substances and a clear 
glass pipe were found on defendant's person. 
R. 83-84. 
10
 See Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311, Kll ("Because the trial 
court ruled that the initial detention was legal, the issue of 
inevitable discovery was not addressed below.") See also State v. 
Sampson, 808 P. 2d 1100, 1111 n.19 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (Remand 
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issue of inevitable discovery was argued below, R. 131 [12-14], 
relevant evidence was presented, R. 129 [2-22], and relevant 
findings of fact were issued. R. 83-84. The only rulings required 
now are conclusions of law, and a remand for those conclusions is 
not necessary because they are granted no deference on appeal.11 
Finally, this Court has readily examined the issue of 
inevitable discovery where the record contains sufficient facts 
to review it. In State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) , this Court found that money allegedly used in drug 
distribution activity was the fruit of an illegal entry by police 
officers, and the State did not show that the money would have 
been inevitably discovered. Id. at 1295. There, relevant evidence 
was already on record and this Court decided the issue of 
inevitable discovery as a matter of law. Id. 
In this case, the circumstances surrounding the discovery of 
the controlled substances, Mr. Warren's lack of a valid driver's 
license, the impoundment of Mr. Warren's vehicle, and Mr. 
proper because Mt]he State had no occasion to argue either [the 
"independent source doctrine' or the "inevitable discovery rule'] 
on appeal or below. Consequently, we are unable to determine 
whether either of these exceptions might apply in this case to 
some of the evidence which we might otherwise have to be 
suppressed.") 
11
 State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, \l, 996 P.2d 546; Salt Lake 
City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, 18, 994 P.2d 1283; State v. 
Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
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Warren's arrest are already on record and the trial court has 
already made findings of fact regarding these issues. Thus, this 
court may properly decide the issue of inevitable discovery as a 
matter of law, and a remand to the trial court for further 
findings is not required.12 
12
 In his opening brief Mr. Warren argued that the discovery 
of the controlled substances was not inevitable because it is not 
clear that Mr. Warren's vehicle contained a concealed weapon and 
he would have been arrested on that charge. Aplt. Br. 26-31. The 
State asserted: 
[D]efendant waived [this challenge] when he entered his 
guilty plea to the cocaine charge without conditioning 
it on the right to challenge the validity of the 
concealed weapon charge. Defendant specifically 
conditioned his guilty plea on the right to appeal the 
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress . . . 
Therefore, absent any challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the now dismissed concealed 
weapon charge, it is assumed at this juncture that the 
evidence was sufficient to support that charge. 
Appellee's Br. 20 (citations omitted). 
However, the State cites no authority for the novel 
proposition that evidence for dismissed charges is assumed to be 
sufficient to support the charge. Additionally, in State v. 
Rivera, 943 P.2d 1344 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized that when a defendant enters a conditional plea of 
guilty, reserving in the record the right to appeal any specified 
pre-trial motion, the defendant "shall be allowed to withdraw the 
plea" if the appeal is successful. Id. at 1345 (quoting Utah R. 
Crim P. 11 (i)). In that event, the prosecutor will have the 
option of offering a second plea bargain agreement, which may or 
may not involve the dismissal of some of the original charges. In 
due course, evidence may be presented at trial with regard to all 
charges, and there is no presumption that evidence is assumed to 
be sufficient for any charge. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's conclusion that Officer Swensen's 
questioning of Mr. Warren did not exceed the scope of the initial 
traffic stop in violation of Mr. Warren's constitutional 
guarantees of protection from unreasonable searches and seizures 
was erroneous. The further conclusion that the subsequent frisk 
did not -violate these same guarantees was also erroneous. 
Therefore, the trial court's failure to suppress evidence on the 
basis of these erroneous conclusions should be reversed. 
Although the State argues that this case should be remanded 
for further proceedings regarding the issue of inevitable 
discovery, a remand is not necessary. The issue of inevitable 
discovery was presented below and the record contains sufficient 
information for this Court to decide this issue as a matter of 
law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jjj±L day of February 
2001. 
HEATHER JC&HNSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
At any rate, Mr. Warren specifically conditioned his plea 
agreement on the outcome of this appeal. R. 103. The State below 
raised the issue of "inevitable discovery." R. 131 [13]. To argue 
that Mr. Warren is barred from addressing that argument 
frustrates his ability to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress evidence, which his plea agreement specifically allowed. 
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